The idea of a multiverse -an ensemble of universes or universe domains -has received increasing attention in cosmology, both as the outcome of the originating process that generated our own universe, and as an explanation for why our universe appears to be fine-tuned for life and consciousness. Here we carefully consider how multiverses should be defined, stressing the distinction between the collection of all possible universes, and ensembles of really existing universes, which are essential for an anthropic argument. We show that such realised multiverses are by no means unique, and in general require the existence of a well-defined and physically motivated distribution function on the space of all possible universes. Furthermore, a proper measure on these spaces is also needed, so that probabilities can be calculated. We then discuss several other major physical and philosophical problems which arise in the context of ensembles of universes, including the emergence and causal effectiveness of self-consciousness, realized infinities, and finetuning, or the apparent need for very special initial conditions for our universe -whether they or generalized generic primordial conditions are more fundamental. Then we briefly summarise scenarios like chaotic inflation, which suggest how ensembles of universe domains may be generated, and point out that the regularities which must underlie any systematic description of truly disjoint multiverses must imply some kind of common generating mechanism. Finally, we discuss the issue of testability, which underlies the question of whether multiverse proposals are really scientific propositions.
Introduction
Over the past twenty years the proposal of a really existing ensemble of universes -or multiverse -has gained prominence in cosmology, even though there is so far only inadequate theoretical or observational support for its existence. The popularity of this proposal can be traced to two factors. The first is that quite a few promising programs of research in quantum and very early universe cosmology suggest that the very processes which could have brought our universe or region of the universe into existence from a primordial quantum configuration, would have generated many other universes or universe regions as well. This was first modelled in a specific way by Andrei Linde (Linde 1983 (Linde , 1990 ) in his chaotic cosmology scenario. Since then many others, e. g. Leslie (1996) , , Sciama (1993) , Deutsch (1998) , Tegmark (1998 Tegmark ( , 2003 , Smolin (1999) , Lewis (2000) , , and Rees (2001) have discussed ways in which an ensemble of universes or universe domains might originate naturally.
So far, none of these proposals has been developed to the point of actually describing such ensembles of universes in detail, nor has it been demonstrated that a generic well-defined ensemble will admit life. Some writers tend to imply that there is only one possible multiverse, characterised by "all that can exist does exist" (Lewis 2000 , see also Gardner 2003) . This vague prescription actually allows a vast variety of different realisations with differing properties, leading to major problems in the definition of the ensembles and in averaging, due to the lack of a well-defined measure and the infinite character of the ensemble itself. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that we shall ever be able to accurately delineate the class of all possible universes.
The second factor stimulating the popularity of multiverses is that a multiverse is really the only scientifically accessible way of avoiding the fine-tuning seemingly required for our universe. This is the anthropic principle connection: If any of a large number of parameters which characterize our universe -including fundamental constants and initial conditions -were slightly different, our universe would not be suitable for complexity or life. What explains the precise adjustment of these parameters so that microscopic and macroscopic complexity and life eventually emerged? One can introduce a "Creator" who intentionally sets their values to assure the eventual development of complexity.
But this move takes us beyond science. The existence of a large collection of universes, which represents the full range of possible parameter values, though not providing an ultimate explanation, would provide a scientifically accessible way of avoiding the need for such fine-tuning. If physical cosmogonic processes naturally produced such a variety of universes, one of which was ours, then the puzzle of fine-tuning is solved. We simply find ourselves in one in which all the many conditions for life have been fulfilled. Of course, through cosmology we must then discover and describe the process by which that collection of diverse universes, or universe domains, was generated, or at least could have been generated, with the full range of characteristics they possess. This may be possible. It is analogous to the way in which we look upon the special character of our Solar System. We do not agonize how initial conditions for the Earth and our Solar System were specially set so that life would eventually emerge -though at some level that is still a mystery. We simply realize that our Solar System in one of hundreds of billions of others in the Milky Way, and accept that, though the probability that any one of them is bio-friendly is very low, at least a few of them will naturally be. We have emerged as observers in one of those. No direct fine-tuning is required, provided we take for granted both the nature of the laws of physics and the specific initial conditions in the universe. The natural processes of stellar formation throughout our galaxy leads to the generation of the full range of posssible stellar systems and planets.
Before going on, it is necessary to clarify our terminology. Some refer to the separate expanding universe regions in chaotic inflation as 'universes', even though they have a common causal origin and are all part of the same single spacetime. In our view (as 'uni' means 'one') the Universe is by definition the one unique connected 1 existing spacetime of which our observed expanding cosmological domain is a part. We will refer to situations such as in chaotic inflation as a Multi-Domain Universe, as opposed to a completely causally disconnected Multiverse. Throughout this paper, when our discussion pertains equally well to disjoint collections of universes (multiverses in the strict sense) and to the different domains of a Multi-Domain Universe, we shall for simplicity simply use the word "ensemble". When the universes of an ensemble are all sub-regions of a larger connected spacetime -the "Universe as a whole"-we have the multi-domain situation, which should be described as such. Then we can reserve "multiverse" for the collection of genuinely disconnected "universes" -those which are not locally causally related.
In this article, we shall critically examine the concept of an ensemble of universes or universe domains, both from a physical and from a philosophical point of view, reviewing how they are to be defined physically and mathematically in cosmology (Ellis, Kirchner and Stoeger 2003 , hereafter referred to as EKS), how their existence could conceivably be validated scientifically, and focusing upon some of the key philosophical problems associated with them. These include their possibility and their realisation, their similarities and their differences, their interconnecteness as part of the ensemble, and whether or not there can be an infinite number of actually existing universes (the problem of realised infinity). We have already addressed the physics and cosmology of such ensembles in a previous paper (EKS), along with some limited discussion of philosophical issues. Here we shall summarize the principal conclusions of that paper and then discuss in detail the more philosophical issues.
First of all, we review what we have already emphasised (see EKS) regarding the description of the the set of possible universes and sets of realised (i. e., really existing) universes and the relationship between these two kinds of sets. It is fundamental to have a general provisionally adequate scheme to describe the set of all possible universes. Using this we can then move forward to describe potential sets of actually existing universes by defining distribution functions (discrete or continuous) on the space of possible universes. A given distribution function indicates which of the theoretically possible universes have been actualized to give us a really existing ensemble of universes or universe domains. It is obviously crucial to maintain the distinction between the set of all possible universes, and the set of all existing universes. For it is the set of all existing universes which needs to be explained by cosmology and physics -that is, by a primordial originating process or processes. Furthermore, it is only an actually existing ensemble of universes with the required range of properties which can provide an explanation for the existence of our bio-friendly universe without fine-tuning (see also McMullin 1993, p. 371) . A conceptually possible ensemble is not sufficient for this purposeone needs universes which actually exist, along with mechanisms which generate their existence. Finally, though the ensemble of all possible universes is undoubtedly infinite, having an infinite ensemble of existing universes is very problematic, as we shall discuss in some detail later. For all these reasons, any adequate cosmological account of the origin of our universe as one of a collection of many universes -or even as a single realised universe -must include a process whereby the realised ensemble is selected from the space of all possible universes and physically generated. But it must also provide some metaphysical view on the origin of the set of possible universes as a subset of the set of conceivable universes 2 .
Describing Ensembles: Possibility
To characterize an ensemble of existing universes, we first need to develop adequate methods for describing the class of all possible universes. This itself is philosophically controversial, as it depends very much on what we regard as "possible." At the very least, describing the class of all possible universes requires us to specify, at least in principle, all the ways in which universes can be different from one another, in terms of their physics, chemistry, biology, etc. We have done this in EKS, which we shall review here.
The Set of Possible Universes
Ensembles of universes, or multiverses, are most clearly represented by the structure and the dynamics of a space M of all possible universes, each of which can be described in terms of a set of states s in a state space S (EKS). Each universe m in M will be characterised by a set P of distinguishing parameters p, which are coordinates on S (EKS). Each m will evolve from its initial state to some final state according to the operative dynamics, with some or all of its parameters varying as it does so. The course of this evolution of states will be represented by a path in the state space S. Thus, each such path (in degenerate cases, a point) is a representation of one of the universes m in M. The parameter space P has dimension N which is the dimension of the space of models M; the space of states S has N + 1 dimensions, the extra dimension indicating the change of each model's states with time, characterised by an extra parameter, e.g., the Hubble parameter H which does not distinguish between models but rather determines what is the state of dynamical evolution of each model. Note that N may be infinite, and indeed will be so unless we consider only geometrically highly restricted sets of universes.
Thus, the description of the space M of possible universes m is based on an assumed set of laws of behaviour, either laws of physics or metalaws that determine the laws of physics, which all m have in common. Without this, we have no basis for defining it. Its overall characterisation must therefore incorporate a description both of the geometry of the allowed universes and of the physics of matter. Thus the set of parameters P will include both geometric and physical parameters.
Among the important subset of the space M are (EKS): M FLRW , the subset of all possible Friedmann-Lemaître-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) universes, which are exactly isotropic and spatially homogeneous; M almost−FLRW , the subset of all universes which deviate from exact FLRW models by only small, linearly growing anisotropies and inhomogeneities; M anthropic , the subset of all possible universes in which life emerges at some stage in their evolution. This subset intersects M almost−FLRW , and may even be a subset of M almost−FLRW , but does not intersect M FLRW , since realistic models of a life-bearing universe like ours cannot be exactly FLRW, for then there is no structure.
If M truly represents all possibilities, as we have already emphasized, one must have a description that is wide enough to encompass all possibilities. It is here that major issues arise: how do we decide what all the possibilities are? What are the limits of possibility? What classifications of possibility are to be included?
From these considerations we have the first key issue (EKS):
Issue 1: What determines M? Where does this structure come from? What is the meta-cause, or ground, that delimits this set of possibilities? Why is there a uniform structure across all universes m in M?
It is clear, as we have discussed in EKS, that these questions cannot be answered scientifically, though scientific input is necessary for doing so. How can we answer them philosophically?
Adequately Specifying Possible Anthropic Universes
When defining any ensemble of universes, possible or realised, we must specify all the parameters which differentiate members of the ensemble from one another at any time in their evolution.
The values of these parameters may not be known or determinable initially in many cases -some of them may only be set by transitions that occur via processes like symmetry breaking within given members of the ensemble. In particular, some of the parameters whose values are important for the origination and support of life may only be fixed later in the evolution of universes in the ensemble. We can separate our set of parameters P for the space of all possible universes M into different categories, beginning with the most basic or fundamental, and progressing to more contingent and more complex categories (see EKS). Ideally they should all be independent of one another, but we will not be able to establish that independence for each parameter, except for the most fundamental cosmological ones. In order to categorise our parameters, we can doubly index each parameter p in P as p j (i) such that those for j = 1 − 2 describe basic physics, for j = 3 − 5 describe the cosmology (given that basic physics), and j = 6 − 7 pertain specifically to emergence of complexity and of life (see EKS for further details).
Though we did not do so in our first paper EKS, it may be helpful to add a separate category of parameters p 8 (i), which would relate directly to the emergence of consciousness and selfconscious life, as well as to the causal effectiveness of self-conscious (human) life -of ideas, intentions and goals. It may turn out that all such parameters may be able to be reduced to those of p 7 (i), but that may, instead, turn out not to be possible. We shall return later (Section 4) to a discussion of the philosophical issues connected with p 8 (i) parameters.
All these parameters will describe the set of possibilities we are able to characterise on the basis of our accumulated scientific experience. This is by no means a statement that "all that can occur" is arbitrary. On the contrary, specifying the set of possible parameters determines a uniform high-level structure that is obeyed by all universes in M.
In the companion cosmology/physics paper to this one (EKS), we develop in detail the geometry, parameters p 5 (i), and the physics, parameters p 1 (i) to p 4 (i), of possible universes. There we also examine in detail the FLRW sector M F LRW of the ensemble of all possible universes M to illustrate the relevant mathematical and physical issues.
We shall not repeat those discussions here, as they do not directly impact our treatment of the philosophical issues upon which we are focusing. However, since one of the primary motivations for developing the multiverse scenario is to provide a scientific solution to the anthropic fine-tuning problem, we need to discuss briefly the set of "anthropic" universes.
The Anthropic subset
The subset of universes that allow intelligent life to emerge is of particular interest. That means we need a function on the set of possible universes that describes the probability that life may evolve. An adaptation of the Drake equation (Drake and Shostak) gives for the expected number of planets with intelligent life in any particular universe m in an ensemble (EKS),
where N g is the number of galaxies in the model and N S the average number of stars per galaxy, the probability that a star provides a habitat for life is expressed by the product
and the probability of coming into existence of life, given such a habitat, is expressed by the product
Here f S is the fraction of stars that can provide a suitable environment for life (they are 'Sunlike'), f p is the fraction of such stars that are surrounded by planetary systems, n e is the mean number of planets in each such system that are suitable habitats for life (they are 'Earth-like'), f l is the fraction of such planets on which life actually originates, and f i represents the fraction of those planets on which there is life where intelligent beings develop. The anthropic subset of a possibility space is that set of universes for which N life (m) > 0. The quantities {N g , N S , f S , f p , n e , f l , f i } are functions of the physical and cosmological parameters characterised above, so there will be many different representations of this parameter set depending on the degree to which we try to represent such interrelations.
In EKS, following upon our detailed treatment of M F LRW we identify those FLRW universes in which the emergence and sustenance of life is possible on a broad level 3 -the necessary cosmological conditions have been fulfilled allowing existence of galaxies, stars, and planets if the universe is perturbed, so allowing a non-zero factor N g * N S * Π as discussed above. The fraction of these that will actually be life-bearing depends on the fulfilment of a large number of other conditions represented by the factor F = f l * f i , which will also vary across a generic ensemble, and the above assumes this factor is non-zero.
If we wish to deal with specifically human life, we need to make the space M large enough to incorporate all relevant parameters, p 6 (i) to p 8 (i), so that free self-consciousness and free will arise. This raises substantial extra complications, which we shall address below (Section 4).
The Set of Realised Universes
We have now characterised the set of possible universes. But in any given existing ensemble, many will not be realised, and some may be realised many times. The purpose of this section is to review our formalism (EKS) for specifying which of the possible universes (characterised above) occur in a particular realised ensemble.
A distribution function describing an ensemble of realised universes
In order to select from M a set of realised universes we need to define on M a distribution function f (m) specifying how many times each type of possible universe m in M is realised 4 . The function f (m) expresses the contingency in any actualisation -the fact that not every possible universe has to be realised. Things could have been different! Thus, f (m) describes the ensemble of universes or multiverse envisaged as being realised out of the set of possibilities. In general, these realisations include only a subset of possible universes, and multiple realisation of some of them. Even at this early stage of our discussion we can see that the really existing ensemble of universes is by no means unique.
The class of models considered is determined by all the parameters which are held constant ('class parameters'). Considering the varying parameters for a given class ('member parameters'), some will take only discrete values, but for each one allowed to take continuous values we need a volume element of the possibility space M characterised by parameter increments dp j (i) in all such varying parameters p j (i). The volume element will be given by a product π = Π i,j m ij (m) dp j (i) (4) where the product Π i,j runs over all continuously varying member parameters i, j in the possibility space, and the m ij weight the contributions of the different parameter increments relative to each other. These weights depend on the parameters p j (i) characterising the universe m. The number of galaxies corresponding to the set of parameter increments dp j (i) will be dN given by
for continuous parameters; for discrete parameters, we add in the contribution from all allowed parameter values. The total number of galaxies in the ensemble will be given by
(which will often diverge), where the integral ranges over all allowed values of the member parameters and we take it to include all relevant discrete summations. The probable value of any specific quality p(m) defined on the set of galaxies will be given by
Such integrals over the space of possibilities give numbers, averages, and probabilities. Now it is conceivable that all possibilities are realised -that all universes in M exist at least once. This would mean that the distribution function
But there are an infinite number of distribution functions which would fulfil this condition. So not even a really existing 'ensemble of all possible universes' is unique. In such ensembles, all possible values of each distinguishing parameter would be represented by its members in all possible combinations with all other parameters at least once. One of the problems is that this means that the integrals associated with such distribution functions would often diverge, preventing the calculation of probabilities.
From these considerations we have the second key issue:
Issue 2: What determines f (m)? What is the meta-cause that delimits the set of realisations out of the set of possibilities?
The answer to this question has to be different from the answer to Issue 1, precisely because here we are describing the contingency of selection of a subset of possibilities for realisation from the set of all possibilities -determination of the latter being what is considered in Issue 1. As we saw in EKS, and as we shall further discuss here (see Section 6), these questions can, in principle, be partially answered scientifically. A really existing ensemble of universes or universe domains demands the operation of a generating process, which adequately explains the origin of its members with their ranges of characteristics and their distribution over the parameters describing them, from a more fundamental potential or a specific primordial quantum configuration. That is, there must be a specific generating process, whatever it is, which determines f (m). Later on, we shall see that there are strong arguments suggesting that the number of members in any such ensemble must be finite (see Section 5) . Now, when it comes to the further question, what is responsible for the operation of this or that specific generating process rather than some other one which would generate a different ensemble, we see (EKS) that an adequate answer cannot be given scientifically. This is the question why the primordial dynamics leading to the given really existing ensemble of universes is of a certain type rather than of some other type. Even if we could establish f (m) in detail, it is difficult to imagine how we would scientifically explain why one generating process was instantiated rather than some other one. The only possibility for an answer, if any, is via philosophical, or possibly theological, considerations.
Measures and Probabilities
From what we have seen above, it is clear that f (m) will enable us to derive numbers and probabilities relative to the realisation it defines only if we also have determined a unique measure π on the ensemble, characterised by a specific choice of the weights m ij (m) in (4), where these weights will depend on the p j (i). There are a number of difficult challenges we face in doing this, including the lack of a "natural measure" on M in all its coordinates, the determination of f (m), or its equivalent, from compelling physical considerations, and the possible divergence of the probability integrals (see Kirchner and Ellis, 2003) . These issues have been discussed in EKS.
The Anthropic subset
The expression (1) can be used in conjunction with the distribution function f (m) of galaxies to determine the expected number of life-bearing universes arising in the whole ensemble:
(which is a particular case of (7) based on (1)). An anthropic ensemble is one for which N life (E) > 0. If the distribution function derives from a probability function, we may combine the probability functions to get an overall anthropic probability function -for an example see Weinberg (2000), where it is assumed that the probability for galaxy formation is the only relevant parameter for the existence of life. This is equivalent to assuming that N S * f S * f p * n e * f l * f i > 0.
This assumption might be acceptable in our physically realised Universe, but there is no reason to believe it would hold generally in an ensemble because these parameters will depend on other ensemble parameters, which will vary.
Anthropic Parameters and Consciousness
The astrophysical issues expressed in the product Π (the lower-j parameters: j ≤ 6) are the easier ones to investigate anthropically. We can in principle make a cut between those consistent with the eventual emergence of life and those incompatible with it by considering each of the factors in N g , N S , and Π in turn, taking into account their dependence on the parameters p 1 (i) to p 5 (i), and only considering the next factor if all the previous ones are non-zero. In this way we can assign "bio-friendly intervals" to the possibility space M. If N g * N S * Π is non-zero we can move on to considering similarly whether F is non-zero, based on the parameters p 6 (i) to p 8 (i), determining if true complexity is possible, which in turn depends on the physics parameters p 1 (i) in a crucial way that is not fully understood.
As we go to higher-level parameters we will narrow the number of the number of universes consistent with self-conscious life even more. Essentially, we shall have the sequence of inequalities:
where N j is the total number of universes specified by parameters of level j which are compatible with the eventual emergence of self-conscious life.
This clearly fits very nicely with the Bayesian Inference approach to probability and provides the beginnings of an implementation of it for these multiverses. This approach also clearly keeps the distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions intact throughout. At each level we add to the necessary conditions for complexity or life, weeding out those universes which fail to meet any single necessary condition. Sufficiency is never really reached in our description -we really do not know the full set of conditions which achieve sufficiency. Life demands unique combinations of many different parameter values that must be realised simultaneously. Higherorder (j ≥ 6) parameters p j (i) may not even be relevant for many universes or universe domains in a given ensemble, since the structures and processes to which they refer may only be able to emerge for certain very narrow ranges of the lower-j parameters. It will be impossible at any stage to characterise that set of M in which all the conditions necessary for the emergence of self-conscious life and its maintenance have been met, for we do not know what those conditions are (for example, we do not know if there are forms of life possible that are not based on carbon and organic chemistry). Nevertheless it is clear that life demands unique combinations of many different parameter values that must be realised simultaneously, but do not necessarily involve all parameters (for example Hogan [19] suggests that only 8 of the parameters of the standard particle physics model are involved in the emergence of complexity). When we look at these combinations, they will span a very small subset of the whole parameter space (Davies 2003 , Tegmark 2003 .
This discussion raises, and even presupposes, the resolution of, certain important issues: Can truly new qualities emerge in the course of evolution of a given universe? Or must they have precursors which inevitably trigger their realisation at certain transition points in cosmic evolution? That is, is true emergence of novelty possible, or is it always just a realisation of features that were present in latent form all along? This is really the issue of ontological and causal reductionism. In our discussion in this subsection we have presumed that full ontological and causal reductionism is not possible -as seems to be the case, from the evidence we have from quantum phenomena like superfluidity and the quantum hall effect (Laughlin 1999) and from the sciences of complexity: phenomena like spontaneous symmetry breaking, the physics of complex systems, and the generation and reliable transfer of the biological (semantic) information which is essential for living systems. But we could be incorrect in assuming this. If so, the number of parameters necessary for adequately characterising the multiverse M may be fewer than we have implied here.
Whether reductionism or the genuine emergence of new and surprising characteristics turns out to be the more accurate characterisation of reality, one thing is certain. If the realised ensemble of universes or universe domains to which ours belongs is to account for reality as we know it, including human consciousness, it must incorporate parameters p 8 (j) reflecting human understanding and ideas as well as intentions and goals, because these are demonstrably causally effective in our universe (they have, for example, led to the text you are now reading). However, physics as we know it today is unable to encompass these dimensions; for example it is unable to explain even the existence of a pair of spectacles, let alone a Jumbo jet, because it does not have within its competence the ability to describe human scientific theories and intellectual comprehension, nor human emotions, intentions, and social constructions. Nevertheless, as just stated, these are clearly all causally effective in the physical world (without them spectacles and the Jumbo Jet and chess games would not exist). Physics as we know it cannot comprehend these issues, and so by itself cannot give a causally complete description of the universe (Ellis 2003) . That is why in Section 2.2 we specifically made the point of introducing the parameters p 8 (i), which directly relate to the emergence of and the causal effectiveness of self-conscious life, and which are almost certainly not reducible to the parameters in category p 7 (i). A 'Theory of Everything' of the kind envisaged by string theorists, for example, simply does not by itself have the capacity to handle such issues. Either physics must be extended so as to include these dimensions of existence (such as consciousness), because they are causally effective, or it must give up the claim to provide a complete causal description of features that affect the physical world.
In either case, the implication is that laws of physics of the kind we currently have at hand do not by themselves suffice to encompass all of causation. The effects of consciousness must be included in any causally complete scheme. We do not yet know how to do this, but without including them we do not have an ensemble that can adequately handle the issue of the existence and nature of life as we know it and experience it. We need to try somehow to consider all that is possible -all that can happen -in this realm, too. We do not have a reliable basis for undertaking that task at present.
Problems With Infinity
When speaking of multiverses or ensembles of universes -possible or realised -the issue of infinity inevitably crops up. Researchers often envision an infinite set of universes, in which all possibilities are realised. Can there be an infinite set of really existing universes? We suggest that, on the basis of well-known philosophical arguments, the answer is No. The common perception that this is possible arises from not appreciating the precisions in meaning and the restrictions in application associated with this profoundly difficult concept. Because we can assign a symbol to represent 'infinity' and can manipulate that symbol according to specified rules, we assume corresponding "infinite" entities can exist in practice. This is highly questionable 5 . It is very helpful to recognize at the outset that there are two different concepts of "the infinite" which are often used: The metaphysical infinite, which designates wholeness, perfection, selfsufficiency; and the mathematical infinite, which emphasizes that which is without limit (Moore 1990 , pp.1-2, 34-44; Bracken 1995, p.142, n.12). Here we are concerned with the mathematical infinite 6 . But, now there are really two basic categories of the mathematical infinite: The potential or conceptual infinite and the actual, or realised, infinite. This distinction goes back to rather unfocused, diffuse but very relevant discussions by Aristotle in his Physics and his Metaphysics. Basically, the potential or conceptual infinite refers to a process or set which has no limit to it -it goes on and on, e.g. the integers. The concept defining the set or process is without a bound or limit to it. The actual, or realized, infinite would be a concrete real object or entity which has no limit to its specifications (in space, time, number of components, etc.). Aristotle and many others since have argued, rather compellingly, that though there are many examples of potential or conceptual infinities, actual realised infinities are not possible as applied to entities or groups of entities. This is basically because any realised entity or group requires a definite limit to its extent in space, its number of components, etc. -its characteristics must be determinates. We cannot, for example, have a really existing metaphysically indeterminately large group of stars. Here we shall not delve more deeply into the philosophical background regarding this question. Bracken (1995, pp.11-24) gives a recent critical summary of Aristotle's treatment of these issues, and their later use by Thomas Aquinas, Schelling and Heidegger (Bracken, pp.25-51).
Thus, according to this view, there is no conceptual problem with an infinite set -countable or uncountable -of possible or conceivable universes. However, also according to this traditional treatment and as stressed by David Hilbert (1964) , it can be very strongly argued that a really existing infinite set is not possible. As he points out, the presumed existence of the actually infinite directly or indirectly leads to wellrecognised unresolvable contradictions in set theory (e. g., the Russell paradox, involving the set of all sets which do not contain themselves, which by definition must both be a member of itself and not a member of itself!), and thus in the definitions and deductive foundations of mathematics itself (Hilbert, pp.141-142).
Hilbert's basic position is that "Just as operations with the infinitely small were replaced by operations with the finite which yielded exactly the same results . . ., so in general must deductive methods based on the infinite be replaced by finite procedures which yield exactly the same results." (p.135) He strongly maintains that "the infinite is nowhere to be found in reality, no matter what experiences, observations, and knowledge are appealed to." (p.142, see also pp.136-137) Further on he remarks, "Material logical deduction is indispensable. It deceives us only when we form arbitrary abstract definitions, especially those which involve infinitely many objects. In such cases we have illegitimately used material logical deduction; i.e., we have not paid sufficient attention to the preconditions necessary for its valid use." (p.142). Hilbert concludes, "Our principal result is that the infinite is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought . . . The role that remains for the infinite to play is solely that of an idea . . . which transcends all experience and which completes the concrete as a totality . . ." (Hilbert, p.151).
Others (see Spitzer 2000 and Stoeger 2003 and references therein) have further pointed out that realised infinite sets are not constructible -there is no procedure one can in principle implement to complete such a set -they are simply incompletable. But, if that is the case, then "infinity" cannot be arrived at, or realised, in a concrete physical setting. On the contrary, the concept itself implies its inability to be realised! This is why for example a realised past infinity in time is not considered possible from this standpoint -since it involves an infinite set of completed events or moments. There is no way of constructing such a realised set, or actualising it 7 . Thus, it is important to recognise that infinity is not an actual number we can ever specify, determine or reach -it is simply the code-word for "it continues without end". And something that is not specifiable or determinate in quantity or extent is not materially or physically realisable. Whenever infinities emerge in physics -such as in the case of singularities -we can be reasonably sure, as is usually recognised, that there has been a breakdown in our models. An achieved infinity in any physical parameter (temperature, density, spatial curvature) is almost certainly not a possible outcome of any physical process -simply because it means traversing in actuality an interval of values which never ends, or specifying what is essentially unspecifiable and indeterminate in quantity or extent.
In geometry we assume space extends forever in Euclidean geometry and in many cosmological models, but we can never prove that any realised 3-space in the real universe continues in this way -it is an untestable concept, and the real spatial geometry of the universe is almost certainly not Euclidean. Thus infinite Euclidean space as such is an abstraction that is almost certainly never realised in physical practice.
In the physical universe spatial infinities can be avoided by compact spatial sections, either resultant from positive spatial curvature or from choice of compact topologies in universes that have zero or negative spatial curvature, (for example FLRW flat and open universes can have finite rather than infinite spatial sections). We argue that the theoretically possible infinite space sections of many cosmologies at a given time are simply unattainable in practice -they are a theoretical idea that cannot be realised. Future infinite time also is never realised: rather the situation is that whatever time we reach, there is always more time available. Much the same ap-plies to claims of a past infinity of time: there may be unbounded time available in the past in principle, but in what sense can it be attained in practice? The arguments against an infinite past time are strong -it is simply not constructible in terms of events or instants of time, besides being conceptually indefinite. 8 We emphasize that the problem with infinity is not primarily physical, in the usual sense -it is primarily a conceptual or philosophical problem with the idea of "realised infinity." Infinity as it is mathematically conceived and used is not the sort of property that can be physically realised in an entity, an object, or a system, like a definite number can. It is indeterminate, and refers to a never-ending process rather than to an entity (Bracken 1995, pp.11-24) . As emphasized above, it means "indefinitely large," or "continues without limit."
The same problem of a realised infinity appears in considering supposed ensembles of really existing universes. It is very difficult conceiving of an ensemble of many 'really existing' universes that are totally causally disjoint from our own, and how that could come into being -particularly given two important features. First, specifying the geometry of a generic universe requires an infinite amount of information because the quantities in P geometry are fields on spacetime, in general requiring specification at each point (or equivalently, an infinite number of Fourier coefficients) -they will almost always not be algorithmically compressible. This greatly aggravates all the problems regarding infinity and the ensemble itself. Only in highly symmetric cases, like the FLRW solutions, does this data reduce to a finite number of parameters. One can suggest that a statistical description would suffice, where a finite set of numbers describe the statistics of the solution, rather than giving a full description. Whether this suffices to adequately describe an ensemble where 'all that can happen, happens' is a moot point. We suggest not, for the simple reason that there is no guarantee that all possible models will be included in any known statistical description. That assumption is a major restriction on what is assumed to be possible.
Secondly, if many universes in the ensemble 8 One way out would be, as quite a bit of work in quantum cosmology seems to indicate, to have time originating or emerging from the quantum-gravity dominated primordial substrate only "later." In other words, there would have been a "time" or an epoch before time as such emerged. Past time would then be finite, as seems to be demanded by philosophical arguments, and yet the timeless primordial state could have lasted "forever," whatever that would mean. This possibility avoids the problem of constructibility.
themselves really have infinite spatial extent and contain an infinite amount of matter, that entails certain deeply paradoxical conclusions (Ellis and Brundrit 1979) . To conceive of the physical creation of an infinite set of universes (most requiring an infinite amount of information for their prescription, and many of which will themselves be spatially infinite) is at least an order of magnitude more difficult than specifying an existent infinitude of finitely specifiable objects.
The phrase 'everything that can exist, exists' implies such an infinitude, but glosses over all the profound difficulties implied. One should note here particularly that problems arise in this context in terms of the continuum assigned by classical theories to physical quantities and indeed to spacetime itself. Suppose for example that we identify corresponding times in the models in an ensemble and then assume that all values of the density parameter occur at each spatial point at that time. Because of the real number continuum, this is an uncountably infinite set of models -and genuine existence of such an uncountable infinitude is highly problematic. But on the other hand, if the set of realised models is either finite or countably infinite, then almost all possible models are not realised -the ensemble represents a set of measure zero in the set of possible universes. Either way the situation is distinctly uncomfortable. However, we might try to argue around this by a discretization argument: maybe differences in some parameter of less than say 10 −10 are unobservable, so we can replace the continuum version by a discretised one, and perhaps some such discretisation is forced on us by quantum theory. If this is the intention, then that should be made explicit. That solves the 'ultraviolet divergence' associated with the small-scale continuum, but not the 'infrared divergence' associated with supposed infinite distances, infinite times, and infinite values of parameters describing cosmologies.
Even within the restricted set of FLRW models, the problem of realised infinities is profoundly troubling: if all that is possible in this restricted subset happens, we have multiple infinities of realised universes in the ensemble. First, there are an infinite number of possible spatial topologies in the negative curvature case (see e.g. LachiezeRay and Luminet 1995), so an infinite number of ways that universes which are locally equivalent can differ globally. Second, even though the geometry is so simple, the uncountable continuum of numbers plays a devastating role locally: is it really conceivable that FLRW universes actually occur with all values independently of both the cosmological constant and the gravitational constant, and also all values of the Hubble constant, at the instant when the density parameter takes the value 0.97? This gives 3 separate uncountably infinite aspects of the ensemble of universes that are supposed to exist. Again, the problem would be allayed if spacetime is quantized at the Planck level, as suggested for example by loop quantum gravity. In that case one can argue that all physical quantities also are quantized, and the uncountable infinities of the real line get transmuted into finite numbers in any finite interval -a much better situation. We believe that this is a physically reasonable assumption to make, thus softening a major problem for many ensemble proposals. But the intervals are still infinite for many parameters in the possibility space. Reducing the uncountably infinite to countably infinite does not in the end resolve the problem of infinities in these ensembles. It is still an extraordinarily extravagant proposal, and, as we have just discussed, founders in the face of careful conceptual analysis.
On the origin of ensembles
Ensembles have been envisaged both as resulting from a single causal process, and as simply consisting of discrete entities. We discuss these two cases in turn, and then show that they are ultimately not distinguishable from each other.
Processes Naturally Producing Ensembles
Over the past 15 or 20 years, many researchers investigating the very early universe have proposed processes at or near the Planck era which would generate a really existing ensemble of expanding universe domains, one of which is our own observable universe. In fact, their work has provided both the context and stimulus for our discussions in this paper. Each of these processes essentially selects a really existing ensemble from a set of possible universes, often leading to a proposal for a natural definition of a probability distribution on the space of possible universes. Here we briefly describe some of these. and comment on how they fit within the framework we have been discussing. Andrei Linde's chaotic inflationary proposal (Linde 1983 (Linde , 1990 (Linde , 2003 ) is one of the best known scenarios of this type. The scalar field (inflaton) in these scenarios drives inflation and leads to the generation of a large number of causally disconnected regions of the Universe. This process is capable of generating a really existing ensemble of expanding FLRW-like regions, one of which may be our own observable universe region, situated in a much larger universe that is inhomogeneous on the largest scales. No FLRW approximation is possible globally; rather there are many FLRW-like sub-domains of a single fractal universe. These domains can be very different from one another, and can be modelled locally by FLRW cosmologies with different parameters.
Linde This kind of scenario suggests how overarching physics, or a "law of laws"(represented by the inflaton field and its potential), can lead to a really existing ensemble of many very different FLRW-like regions of a larger Universe. However these proposals rely on extrapolations of presently known physics to realms far beyond where its reliability is assured. They also employ inflaton potentials which as yet have no connection to the particle physics we know at lower energies. And these proposals are not directly observationally testable -we have no astronomical evidence that the supposed other FLRW-like regions exist, and indeed do not expect to ever attain such evidence. Thus they remain theoretically based proposals rather than provisionally acceptable models -much less established fact. There remains additionally the difficult problem of infinities, which we have just discussed: eternal inflation with its continual reproduction of different inflating domains of the Universe is claimed to lead to an infinite number of universes of each particular type (Linde, private communication). How can one deal with these infinities in terms of distribution functions and an adequate measure? As we have pointed out above, there is a philosophical problem surrounding a realised infinite set of any kind. In this case the infinities of really existent FLRW-like domains derive from the assumed initial infinite flat (or open) space sections -and we have already pointed out the problems in assuming such space sections are actually realised. If this is correct, then at the very least these proposals must be modified so that they generate a finite number of universes or universe domains. The appearance of an infinite number, as elsewhere in physics, signals that the scenario or model has broken down or is not properly constrained.
Finally, from the point of view of the ensemble of all possible universes often invoked in discussions of multiverses, all possible inflaton potentials should be considered, as well as all solutions to all those potentials. They should all be represented in M, which will include chaotic inflationary models which are stationary as well as those which are non-stationary. Many of these potentials may yield ensembles which are uninteresting as far as the emergence of life is concerned, but some will be bio-friendly.
In EKS we have briefly reviewed various proposals for probability distributions of the cosmological constant over ensembles of universe domains generated by the same inflaton potential, particularly those of Weinberg (2000) and Garriga and Vilenkin (2000 Vilenkin ( , 2001 ). We shall not revisit this work here, except to mention the strong anthropic constraints on values of the cosmological constant, which is the primary reason for interest in this case. Galaxy formation is only possible for a very narrow range of values of the cosmological constant, Λ, around Λ = 0.
In his popular book Our Cosmic Habitat Martin Rees (Rees 2001b , pp. 175ff) uses this narrow range of bio-friendly values of Λ to propose a preliminary test which he claims could rule out the multiverse explanation of fine-tuning for certain parameters like Λ. This is what might be called a "speciality argument." According to Rees, if "our universe turns out to be even more specially tuned than our presence requires," the existence of a multiverse to explain such "over-tuning" would be refuted. The argument itself goes this way. Naive quantum physics expects Λ to be very large. But our presence in the universe requires it to be very small, small enough so that galaxies and stars can form. Thus, in our universe Λ must obviously be below that galaxy-forming threshold. Now, if our universe belongs to an ensemble in which Λ was equally likely to take any value (the uniform probability assumption), then we would not expect it to be too far below this threshold. This is simply because, if it's too far below the threshold, the probability of randomly choosing that universe in the ensemble becomes very small -there are very few universes which such small values of Λ in the ensemble. It would be more likely that any bio-friendly universe we would choose in the ensemble would have a value of Λ closer to the threshold value. Present data on this value indicates that it is not too far below the threshold. Thus, our universe is not markedly more special that it needs to be as far as Λ goes, and explaining its fine-tuning using a multiverse is OK.
Is this argument compelling? There are several problems with it, which are connected with points we have already emphasized. The most important one is the assumption that the ensemble to which our universe belongs is characterized by a uniform probability distribution of the values of Λ. The only way this could be supported is with evidence that a specific category of inflaton potential was responsible for characteristics of our universe, and it was then determined that those inflaton potentials tend to produce universes characterized by such a uniform distribution in Λ. In other words, any conclusions one attempts to draw about the really existing multiverse to which our universe belongs depends on knowing something definite about the generating process which produced it. Others may be possible! Two further difficulties with the argument are: first, we really do not know enough about vacuum energy to say anything about what its value should or should not be, from the point of view of quantum field theory. Secondly, as long as the range of values of a parameter like Λ is not a zeromeasure set of the ensemble, there is a non-zero probability of choosing a universe within it. In that case, there is no justification for ruling out a multiverse. All we can really say is that we would be less likely to find ourselves in a universe with a Λ in that range in that particular ensemble.
In any case, what is actually meant by "more specially tuned than necessary for our existence"? In the end, any particular choice of a life-allowing universe will be more specially tuned for something. In our view "tuning" refers to parameters selected such that the model falls into a certain class, e.g., life-allowing. Any additional tuning would then just be the selection of subclasses, and, after all, any particular model is "over-tuned" in such a way as to select uniquely the sub-class which contains only itself. Rees's argument seems to imply that Λ close to zero would be an over-tuned case, while Λ close to the cut-off value would not be. However, would the reversed viewpoint be not just as legitimate?
Rees's argument strongly builds on the predictions of quantum physics -a probability distribution peaked at very high values for Λ. Taking into account the unknown relation between general relativity and quantum physics we should treat the problem as a multiple hypothesis testing problem: The multiverse scenario can be true or false, and so can the quantum prediction for high values of Λ. An observed low value of Λ would then strongly question the predictions for Λ, but say nothing about the multiverse scenario. We conclude that any observed value of Λ does not rule out the multiverse scenario.
It also seems questionable whether the lifeallowing values for Λ can be classified just by a simple cut-off value. It should be expected that there are more subtle and yet unknown constraints. Observing a cosmological constant far from the cut-off value might then just be the result of some unknown constraints.
Furthermore, the probability to find the cosmological constant in a certain range is given by the integral over its probability distribution. It is not clear why values close to the cut-off value should be (in a generic situation) more likely than all other possible values. Even if the probability distribution is increasing towards the cut-off value, most life-allowing models might have a cosmological constant far from this value.
Thus, Rees' argument is not compelling, without considerably more evidence and knowledge to support its central premises -evidence and knowledge we have already emphasized are not available. There might exist only one universe which just happens to have the observed value of Λ; then probabilistic arguments will simply not apply.
The existence of regularities
Consider now a genuine multiverse. Why should there be any regularity at all in the properties of universes in such an ensemble, where the universes are completely disconnected from each other? If there are such regularities and specific resulting properties, this suggests a mechanism creating that family of universes, and hence a causal link to a higher domain which is the seat of processes leading to these regularities. This in turn means that the individual universes making up the ensemble are not actually independent of each other. They are, instead, products of a single process, or meta-process, as in the case of chaotic inflation. A common generating mechanism is clearly a causal connection, even if not situated in a single connected spacetime -and some such mechanism is needed if all the universes in an ensemble have the same class of properties, for example being governed by the same physical laws or meta-laws.
The point then is that, as emphasized when we considered how one can describe ensembles, any multiverse with regular properties that we can characterise systematically is necessarily of this kind. If it did not have regularities of properties across the class of universes included in the ensemble, we could not even describe it, much less calculate any properties or even characterise a distribution function.
Thus in the end the idea of a completely disconnected multiverse with regular properties but without a common causal mechanism of some kind is not viable. There must necessarily be some pre-realisation causal mechanism at work determining the properties of the universes in the ensemble. What are claimed to be totally disjoint universes must in some sense indeed be causally connected together, albeit in some pre-physics or meta-physical domain that is causally effective in determining the common properties of the universes in the multiverse. This is directly related to the two key issues we highlighted above in Sections 2 and 3, respectively, namely how does the possibility space originate, and where does the distribution function that characterises realised models come from?
From these considerations, we see that we definitely need to explain (for Issue 2) what particular cosmogonic generating process or meta-law pre-exists, and how that process or meta-law was selected from those that are possible. Obviously an infinite regress lurks in the wings. Though intermediate scientific answers to these questions can in principle be given, it is clear that no ultimate scientific foundation can be provided.
Furthermore, we honestly have to admit that any proposal for a particular cosmic generating process or principle we establish as underlying our actually existing ensemble of universe domains or universes, after testing and validation (see Section 7 below), will always be at best provisional and imperfect: we will never be able to definitively determine its nature or properties. The actually existing cosmic ensemble may in fact be much, much larger -or much, much smaller -than the one our physics at any given time describes, and embody quite different generating processes and principles than the ones we provisionally settle upon. This is particularly true as we shall never have direct access to the ensemble we propose, or to the underlying process or potential upon which its existence relies (see Section 7 below), nor indeed to the full range of physics that may be involved.
Turning to the prior question (Issue 1, see Section 2.1), what determines the space of all possible universes, from which a really existing universe or an ensemble of universes or universe domains is drawn, we find ourselves in even much more uncertain waters. This is particularly difficult when we demand some basic meta-principle which delimits the set of possibilities. Where would such a principle originate? The only two secure grounds for determining possibility are existence ("ab esse ad posse valet illatio") and freedom from internal contradiction. The first really does not help us at all in exploring the boundaries of the possible. The second leaves enormous unexplored, and probably unexplorable, territory. There are almost certainly realms of the possible which we cannot even imagine. But at the same time, there may be, as we have already mentioned, universes we presently think are possible which are not. We really do not have secure grounds for determining the limits of possibility in this expanded cosmic context. We simply do not have enough theoretical knowledge to describe and delimit reliably the realm of the possible, and it is very doubtful we shall ever have.
Testability and Existence
The issue of evidence and testing has already been briefly mentioned. This is at the heart of whether an ensemble or multiverse proposal should be regarded as physics or as metaphysics.
Evidence and existence
Given all the possibilities discussed here, which specific kind of ensemble is claimed to exist? Given a specific such claim, how can one show that this is the particular ensemble that exists rather than all the other possibilities?
There is no direct evidence of existence of the claimed other universe regions in an ensemble, nor can there be any, for they lie beyond the visual horizon; most will even be beyond the particle horizon, so there is no causal connection with them; and in the case of a true multiverse, there is not even the possibility of any indirect causal connection -the universes are then completely disjoint and nothing that happens in any one of them is causally linked to what happens in any other one (see Section 6.2). This lack of any causal connection in such multiverses really places them beyond any scientific support -there can be no direct or indirect evidence for the existence of such systems. We may, of course, postulate the existence of such a multiverse as a metaphysical assumption, but it would be a metaphysical assumption without any further justifiability -it would be untestable and unsupportable by any direct or indeed indirect evidence.
And so, we concentrate on possible really existing multiverses in which there is some common causal generating principle or process. What weight does a claim of such existence carry in this case, when no direct observational evidence can ever be available? The point is that there is not just an issue of showing a multiverse exists. If this is a scientific proposition one needs to be able to show which specific multiverse exists; but there is no observational way to do this. Indeed if you can't show which particular one exists, it is doubtful you have shown any one exists. What does a claim for such existence mean in this context? Gardner puts it this way: "There is not the slightest shred of reliable evidence that there is any universe other than the one we are in. No multiverse theory has so far provided a prediction that can be tested. As far as we can tell, universes are not even as plentiful as even two blackberries" (Gardner 2003 ). This contrasts strongly, for example, with Deutsch's and Lewis's defence of the concept (Deutsch 1998, Lewis 2000).
Fruitful Hypotheses and evidence
There are, however, ways of justifying the existence of an entity, or entities, like a multiverse, even though we have no direct observations of it. Arguably the most compelling framework within which to discuss testability is that of "retroduction" or "abduction" which was first described in detail by C.S.Peirce. Ernan McMullin (1992) has convincingly demonstrated that retroduction is the rational process by which scientific conclusions are most fruitfully reached. On the basis of what researchers know, they construct imaginative hypotheses, which are then used to probe and to describe the phenomena in deeper and more adequate ways than before. As they do so, they will modify or even replace the original hypotheses, in order to make them more fruitful and more precise in what they reveal and explain. The hypotheses themselves may often presume the existence of certain hidden properties or entities (like multiverses!) which are fundamental to the explanatory power they possess. As these hypotheses become more and more fruitful in revealing and explaining the natural phenomena they investigate, and their interrelationships, and more central to scientific research in a given discipline, that they become more and more reliable accounts of the reality they purport to model or describe. Even if some of the hidden properties or entities they postulate are never directly detected or observed, the success of the hypotheses indirectly leads us to affirm that something like them must exist. 9 A cosmological example is the inflaton supposed to underlie inflation.
Thus, from this point of view, the existence of an ensemble of universes or universe domains would be a validly deduced -if still provisional -scientific conclusion if this becomes a key component of hypotheses which are successful and fruitful in the long term. By an hypothesis which manifests long-term success and fruitfulness we mean one that better enables us to make testable predictions which are fulfilled, and provides a more thorough and coherent explanation of phenomena we observe than competing theories. [It is interesting to note that Rees (2001b, p. 172) hints at the use of a retroductive approach in cosmology, but does not develop the idea as an argument in any detail.] Ernan McMullin (1992; see also P. Allen 2001, p. 113) frames such fruitfulness and success as:
a. accounting for all the relevant data (empirical adequacy); b. providing long-term explanatory success and stimulating fruitful lines of further inquiry (theory fertility); c. establishing the compatibility of previously disparate domains of phenomena (unifying power); d. manifesting consistency and correlation with other established theories (theoretical coherence). The relevant example here would be a fruitful theory relying on a specific type of multiverse, all members of which would never be directly detectable except one. But, since its postulated existence renders the existence and the characteristic features of our own universe ever more intelligible and coherent over a period of time than without it, this can be claimed to be evidence for the multiverse's existence. If such indirect support for the existence of a given multiverse is inadequate in the light of other competing accounts, then from a scientific point of view all we can do is to treat it as a speculative scenario needing further development and requir- 9 In light of discussions by McMullin elsewhere (McMullin 1993, pp. 381-382) more care and precision is needed here. He recommends separating explanation from proof of existence: "In science, the adequacy of a theoretical explanation is often regarded as an adequate testimony to the existence of entities postulated by the theory. But the debates that swirl around this issue among philosophers (the issue of scientific realism, as philosophers call it) ought to warn us of the risks of moving too easily from explanatory adequacy to truth-claims for the theory itself. This sort of inference depends sensitively on the quality of the explanation given, on the viability of alternatives, on our prior knowledge of beings in the postulated category, and on other more complex factors." ing further fruitful application. Without that, espousing the existence of a given multiverse as the explanation for our life-bearing universe must surely be called metaphysics, because belief in its existence will forever be a matter of faith rather than proof or scientific support.
We do, of course, want to avoid sliding to the bottom of Rees' (2001b, p. 169) slippery slope. In arriving at his conclusion that the existence of other universes is a scientific question, Rees (2001b, pp. 165-169) begins by considering first galaxies which are beyond the limits of presentday telescopes, and then galaxies which are beyond our visual horizon now, but will eventually come within it in the future. In both cases these galaxies are real and observable in principle. Therefore, they remain legitimate objects of scientific investigation. However, then he goes on to consider galaxies which are forever unobservable, but which emerged from the same Big Bang as ours did. And he concludes that, though unobservable, they are real, and by implication should be included as objects considered by science. Other universes, he argues, fall in the same category -they are real, and therefore they should fall within the boundaries of scientific competency. As articulated this is indeed "a slippery slope" argument -it can be used to place anything that we claim to be "real" within the natural sciences -unless we strengthen it at several points. First, Rees shifts the criterion from "observable in principle" to being "real." This is really an error. No matter how real an object, process, or relationship may be, if it is not observable in principle, or if there is not at least indirect support for its existence from the longterm success of the hypotheses in which it figures, then it simply falls outside serious scientific consideration. It may still temporarily play a role in scientific speculation, but, unless it receives some evidential support, that will not last. In mentioning that the forever unobservable galaxies he is considering are produced by the same Big Bang as ours, Rees may be intending to indicate that, though unobservable, they share a common causal origin and therefore figure in successful hypotheses, as would be required by McMullin's retroductive inference discussed above. But Rees does not make that clear. Moving to other universes, the same requirement holds. Thus, the slippery slope is avoided precisely by implementing the "indirect evidence by fruitful hypotheses" approach that a careful application of retroduction requires.
Second, there is discontinuity in the argument as one moves from weaker and weaker causal relation to none at all. The slippery slope becomes a vertical precipice on one side of an unbridgeable gulf. An argument that relies on incremental continuity does not apply in this case.
Thus, if we are continually evaluating our theories and speculations with regard to their potential and actual fruitfulness in revealing and explaining the world around us, then we shall avoid the lower reaches of the slippery slope. The problem is that, in this case, the multiverse hypothesis is very preliminary and will probably always remain provisional. This should not prevent us from entertaining imaginative scenarios, but the retroductive process will subject these speculations to rigorous critique over time. The key issue then is to what degree will the multiverse hypothesis become fruitful. Unfortunately, as it stands now, it is not, because it can be used to explain anything at all -and hence does not explain anything in particular. You cannot predict something new from the hypothesis, but you can explain anything you already know. In order for it to achieve some measure of scientific fruitfulness, there must be an accumulation of at least indirect scientifically acceptable support for one particular well-defined multiverse. Indeed, from a purely evidential viewpoint, a multiverse with say 10 120 identical copies of the one universe in which we actually live would be much preferred over one with a vast variety of different universes for then the probability of finding a universe like our own would be much higher. Such ensembles are usually excluded because of some hidden assumptions about the nature of the generating mechanism that creates the ensemble. But maybe that mechanism is of a different kind than usually assumed -perhaps once it has found a successful model universe, it then churns out innumerable identical copies of the same universe.
In the end belief in a multiverse may always be just that -a matter of faith, namely faith that the logical arguments discussed here give the correct answer in a situation where direct observational proof is unattainable and the supposed underlying physics is untestable, unless we are able to point to compelling reasons based on scientifically supportable evidence for a particular specifiable multiverse or one of a narrowly defined class of multiverses. One way in which this could be accomplished, as we have already indicated, would be to find accumulating direct or indirect evidence that a very definite inflaton potential capable of generating a certain type of ensemble of universe domains was operating in the very early universe, leading to the particular physics that we observe now. Otherwise, there will be no way of ever knowing which particular multiverse is realised, if any one is. We will always be able to claim whatever we wish about such an ensemble, provided it includes at least one universe that admits life.
Observations and Physics
One way one might make a reasonable claim for existence of a multiverse would be if one could show its existence was a more or less inevitable consequence of well-established physical laws and processes. Indeed, this is essentially the claim that is made in the case of chaotic inflation. However the problem is that the proposed underlying physics has not been tested, and indeed may be untestable. There is no evidence that the postulated physics is true in this universe, much less in some pre-existing metaspace that might generate a multiverse.
Thus there are two further requirements which must still be met, once we have proposed a viable ensemble or multiverse theory. The first is to provide some credible link between these vast extrapolations from presently known physics to physics in which we have some confidence. The second is to provide some at least indirect evidence that the scalar potentials, or other overarching cosmic principles involved, really have been functioning in the very early universe, or before its emergence. We do not at present fulfil either requirement.
The issue is not just that the inflaton is not identified and its potential untested by any observational means -it is also that, for example, we are assuming quantum field theory remains valid far beyond the domain where it has been tested, and where we have faith in that extreme extrapolation despite all the unsolved problems at the foundation of quantum theory, the divergences of quantum field theory, and the failure of that theory to provide a satisfactory resolution of the cosmological constant problem.
Observations and disproof
Despite the gloomy prognosis given above, there are some specific cases where the existence of a chaotic inflation (multi-domain) type scenario can be disproved. These are when we live in a 'small universe' where we have already seen right round the universe (Ellis and Schreiber 1986, Lachieze-Ray and Luminet 1995), for then the universe closes up on itself in a single FLRW-like domain and so no further such domains that are causally connected to us in a single connected spacetime can exist.
This 'small universe' situation is observationally testable, and indeed it has been suggested that the CBR power spectrum might already be giving us evidence that this is indeed so, because of its lack of power on the largest angular scales (Luminet et al, 2003) . This proposal can be tested in the future by searching for identical circles in the CMB sky (Roukema, et al., 2004) and alignment of the CMB quadrupole and octopole planes (Katz and Weeks 2004) . Success in this endeavour would disprove the usual chaotic inflationary scenario, but not a true multiverse proposal, for that cannot be shown to be false by any observation. Neither can it be shown to be true.
The Philosophical Choice between the Special and the Generic
When we reflect on the recent history of cosmology, we become aware that philosophical predilections have oscillated from assuming that the present state of our universe is very special (made cosmologically precise in contemporary cosmology as FLRW, or almost-FLRW, through the assumption of a Cosmological Principle -see Bondi 1960 and Weinberg 1972, for example), requiring very finely tuned initial conditions, to assuming it is generic, in the sense that it has attained its present apparently special qualities through the operation of standard physical processes on any of broad range of possible initial conditions (e. g., the "chaotic cosmology" approach of Misner (1968) and the now standard but incomplete inflationary scenario pioneered by Guth (1980) ). This oscillation, or tension, has been described and discussed in detail, both in its historical and in its contemporary manifestations, by McMullin (1993) as a conflict or tension between two general types of principle -anthropic-like principles, which recognize the special character of the universe and tentatively presume that its origin must be in finely tuned or specially chosen initial conditions, and "cosmogonic indifference principles," or just "indifference principles," which concentrate their search upon very generic initial conditions upon which the laws of physics act to produce the special cosmic configuration we now enjoy. As McMullin portrays these two philosophical commitments, the anthropic-type preference inevitably attempts to involve mind and teleology as essential to the shaping of what emerges, whereas the indifference-type preference studiously seeks to avoid any direct appeal to such influences, relying instead completely upon the dynamisms (laws of nature) inherent in and emerging from mass-energy itself. McMullin (1993) , in a compelling historical sketch, traces the preference for the special and the teleologically suggestive from some of the earlier strong anthropic principle formulations back through early Big Bang cosmology to Clarke, Bentley, William Derham and John Ray in the 18th and 19th centuries and Robert Boyle in the 17th century and ultimately back to Plato and the Biblical stories of creation. The competing preference for indifferent initial conditions and the operation of purely physical or biological laws can be similarly followed back from the present appeal to multiverses to slightly earlier inflationary scenarios and Misner's chaotic cosmology program to steady state cosmological models and then back through Darwin to Descartes and much earlier to the Greek atomists, such as Empedocles, Diogenes Laertius and Leucippus. Neither of these historical sequences involves clearly dependent philosophical influences, but the underlying basic assumptions and preferences of each of the two sets of thinkers and models are very similar, as are their controversies and interactions with the representatives of the competing approach.
Certainly it has become clear that the present preference among theoretical cosmologists for multiverse scenarios is the latest and most concerted attempt to implement the indifference principle in the face of the mounting evidence that, taken alone, our universe does require very finely tuned initial conditions. The introduction of inflation was similarly motivated, but has encountered some scepticism in this regard with the growing sense that initiating inflation itself probably requires special conditions (Penrose 1989; Ellis, et al. 2002) . The appeal to multiverses, though first seriously suggested fairly early in this saga (by Dicke in 1961 and by Carter in 1968), has been reasserted as this failure of other indifference principle implementations seem more and more imminent. However, as we have just seen in our detailed discussion of realised ensembles of universes or universe domains, they are by no means unique, and accounting for their existence requires an adequate generating process or principle, which must explain the distribution function characterizing the ensemble.
Even though we are far from being able to connect specific types of ensembles with particular provisionally adequate cosmogonic generating processes in a compelling way, it is very possible that some fine-tuning of these processes may be required to mesh with the physical constraints we observe in our universe and at the same time to produce a realised ensemble which enbraces it. This would initiate another oscillation between the two types of principles. Whether or not that occurs, it is clear that the existence of a multiverse in itself does not support either the indifference principle nor the anthropic-type principle. What would do so would be the distribution function specifying the multiverse, and particularly the physical, pre-physical or metaphysical process which generates the multiverse with that distribution function, or range of distribution functions. Only an understanding of that process would ultimately determine which principle is really basic.
Whatever the eventual outcome of future investigations probing this problem, it is both curious and striking, as McMullin (1993, p. 385) comments, that "the same challenge arises over and over." Fine-tuning at one level is tentatively explained by some process at a more fundamental level which seems at first sight indifferent to any initial conditions. But then further investigation reveals that the process really requires special conditions, which demands some fine-tuning. Meanwhile, "the universe" required for understanding and explanation "keeps getting larger and larger."
It might seem that these competing philosophical or metaphysical preferences -for what is either basically special or basically generic -are choices without scientific or philosophical support. But that is an illusion. From what we have seen already, there is considerable physical and philosophical support for each preference -some of it observational and some of it theoretical -but there is no adequate or definitive support for one over against the other. Thus, either preference may be supported in various ways philosophical and scientifically, but neither the one nor the other is THE scientific approach. For example, the emergent universe model of Ellis, Maartens, et al. (2003) has fine-tuned initial conditions, but it still could be a good model -it may actually represent how the very early history of our universe unfolded, even though it does not explain how the special initial conditions were set. [In fact it is not as fine-tuned as inflation with k = 0, which requires "infinite" fine-tuning, while being "asymptotic" to an Einstein static universe does not.]
The issue is not so much which of the two principles or perspectives are correct -both seem to be important at different levels and in different heuristic and explanatory contexts. As far as we know, there has not been any resolution to the question of the epistemological or ontological status of either one. They function rather as contrary heuristic preferences which have both intuitive and experiential support. Perhaps the real question is: Which is more fundamental? It is possible that, from the point of view of physics, the indifference principle is more fundamental -relative to the explanations which are possible within the sciences -whereas from the point of view of metaphysics, an anthropic-type finetuning principle is more fundamental.
What does seem clear, in this regard, is that the effort to keep explanation and understanding completely within the realm of physics forces us to choose the indifference principle as more fundamental. This is simply because the need for any fine-tuning immediately implies an intentional agent, which takes us outside of where physics or any of the natural sciences can go. However physics and chemistry are known to give a causally incomplete description of the world in which we live, because they are unable to comprehend any situation involving purpose and intent, much less involving emotion and ethicsbut these are all obviously causally effective in the real world. Thus (essentially because they are unable to solve the hard problem of consciousness) physics and chemistry cannot give a causally complete description of all those events involving human action that surround us every day.
Furthermore, as we have also seen, physics and the other sciences cannot delve into the realm of ultimate explanation either. Perhaps these different realms are intimately connected.
Conclusion
As we stressed in the conclusion of EKS, the introduction of the multiverse or ensemble idea is a fundamental change in the nature of cosmology, because it aims to challenge one of the most basic aspects of standard cosmology, namely the uniqueness of the universe (see Ellis 1991 Ellis , 1999 and references therein). So far, research and discussion on such ensembles have not precisely specified what is required to define them, although some specific physical calculations have been given based on restricted low-dimensional multiverses. The aim of EKS was to make clear what is needed to properly define a multiverse, and then examine some of the consequences that flow from this. The aim of this paper is to summarize the key points of EKS, and address more fully philosophical issues related to ensembles of universes or universe domains.
Our fundamental starting point has been the recognition that there is an important distinction to be made between possible universes and realised universes, and a central conclusion is that a really existing ensemble or multiverse is not a priori unique, nor uniquely defined. It must somehow be selected for. In EKS and in this paper we have defined both the ensemble of possible universes M, and ensembles of really existing universes, which are envisioned as generated by a given primordial process or action of an overarching cosmic principle, physical or metaphysical. This effectively selects a really existing multiverse from M, and, as such, effectively defines a distribution function over M. Thus, there is a definite causal connection, or "law of laws, "relating all the universes in each of those multiverses. It is such a really existing ensemble of universes, one of which is our own universe, not the ensemble of all possible universes, which provides the basis for anthropic arguments. Anthropic universes lie in a small subset of M, whose characteristics we understand to some extent. It is very likely that the simultaneous realisation of all the conditions for life will pick out only a very small sector of the parameter space of all possibilities: anthropic universes are fine-tuned in that sense. However, if a certain cosmogonic process or the operation of a certain primordial principle really selected and generated a ensemble of really existing universes from M, some of which are anthropic, then, though we would require some explanation for that process or principle, the fine-tuning of our universe would not require any other scientific explanation.
As we have stressed in this paper, the subset of anthropic universes, both in M and in the really existing ensemble of universes that the operative cosmogonic process or principle selects from M, must include those which are characterized by higher level parameters (j ≥ 6) which not only specify the necessary conditions for the emergence of life beyond those of basic cosmology, but also enable the possibility of the emergence of self-conscious organisms, and their causal influences through understanding and intentionality, technology and culture. There must be enough flexibility and openess in the physics, chemistry and biology of at least some of the anthropic universes to allow for human life and society as we know them. It is possible, but not likely, that all the parameters whose values must be adjusted to ensure this are not above j = 6. This would mean that the parameters of levels j = 7 and j = 8 are reducible to those of j = 6 and below. At present we have very little evidence supporting such reducibility, and considerable, though not definitive, indications otherwise.
Certainly, using our concept of really existing ensembles of universes, we can locate those for which the basic necessary physical and cosmological conditions for life as we know and understand it have been fulfilled. But we are far from being able to determine with any confidence what other necessary conditions -at higher levels -must yet be specified for sufficiency. As we have just implied, any progress in understanding these will depend heavily on the eventual resolution of the reductionism/emergence issues discussed earlier.
Among those universes in which the necessary cosmic conditions for life have been fulfilled is the subset of almost-FLRW universes which are good models of our own observable universe, given the precision of the observational data we have at present. They are a small subset of all possible universes, and it is conceivable that many of them are part of the really existing ensemble of universes. It is, however, abundantly clear, as we have already stressed, that "really existing ensembles" which can be defined as candidates for the one to which our universe belongs are not unique, and neither their properties nor their existence are directly testable. Arguments for their existence would be much stronger if the hypotheses employing them were fruitful in enabling new investigations leading to new predictions and understandings which are testable. However, so far this has not been the case. The only way in which arguments for the existence of one particular kind of multiverse would be scientifically acceptable is if, for instance, there would emerge evidence (either direct or indirect) for the existence of a specific inflaton potential which would generate one particular kind of ensemble of expanding universe domains, as in chaotic inflation. We have as yet no such evidence.
Another philosophical issue we have emphasized which has a strong bearing on how we describe and delimit really existing multiverses is that of realised infinity. From our careful discussion of this concept, there is a compelling case for demanding that every really existing ensemble contain only a finite number of universes or universe domains. Since infinity is not a specified number it seems clear that it cannot be realised in any set of physical objects. For this reason, the concrete physical, or the material, implies finitude. In pursuing the physics of any system or situation we usually enforce this restriction automatically. We must also do so with regard to really existing ensembles of universes and universe domains.
Returning to M, the set of all possible universes, we have underlined the philosophical difficulty of precisely determining or characterizing this ensemble. We simply do not know enough, and probably never will, to provide a precise characterization of M. We can, as we have in EKS and in this paper, indicate broad categories of parameters which characterize universes in general, from the cosmology, physics, chemistry, and biology we know. But there is no assurance whatever that our generalities have embraced all that's possible -nor excluded what is actually impossible.
Finally, there is strong support for both of two competing approaches -that which honors the special character of our universe by stressing the need for the fine-tuning of initial conditions and the laws of nature, and that which locates its emergence in the operation of primordial processes on a much more fundamental generic or indifferent configuration. Both are undoubtedly at work on different levels. The issues are: which is more fundamental, and whether the sciences themselves as they are presently conceived and practiced can deal with ultimate fundamentals. Must they yield that realm to metaphysics? Can metaphysics deal with them? It is relevant here that physics gives a causally incomplete description of the world, as pointed out above (because it is unable to comprehend human intentions) and hence by itself is a poor foundation on which to base metaphysical discussion.
Despite these problems, the idea of a multiverse is probably here to stay -it is an important concept that needs exploration and elucidation. Does the idea that 'all that can exist, exists' in the ensemble context provide an explanation for the anthropic puzzles? Yes it would do so, if it were true. But, as just stated, it is not. The issue of fine tuning is the statement that the biophilic set of universes is a very small subset of the set of possible universes; but if all that can exist exists then there are universe models occupying this biophilic subspace. However, as we have seen, there are the following problems:
(i) the issue of realised infinities discussed above,
(ii) our inability to describe such ensembles because we don't know what all the possibilities are -our solution is in terms of a category we cannot fully describe, (iii) the non-uniqueness and uncertain origin of bio-friendly ensembles of really existing universes -in terms of their distribution functions, and (iv) the relative untestability or unprovability of the multiverse idea in the usual scientific sense -the existence of the hypothesized ensemble remains a matter of faith rather than of proof, unless it comes to enjoy long-term fruitfulness and success.
Furthermore in the end, the multiverse hypothesis simply represents a regress of causation. Ultimate questions remain: Why this multiverse with these properties rather than others? What endows these with existence and with this particular type of overall order? What are the ultimate boundaries of possibility -what makes something possible, even though it may never be realised? In our view these questions -Issues 1 and 2 in this paper -cannot be answered scientifically with any adequacy because of the lack of any possibility of verification of any proposed underlying theory. They will of necessity have to be argued with a mixture of careful philosophically informed science and scientifically informed philosophy. And, even with this, as we have just seen, we seem to fall short of providing satisfactory answers -so far!
As we now see, the concept of a multiverse raises many fascinating issues that have not yet been adequately explored. The discussions here should point and guide research in directions which will yield further insight and understanding.
